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Improving ﬁnancial access to services is an essential part of extending universal health coverage in low
resource settings. In Cambodia, high out of pocket spending and low levels of utilisation have impeded the
expansion of coverage and improvement in health outcomes. For twenty years a series of health ﬁnancing
policies have focused on mitigating costs to increase access particularly by vulnerable groups. Demand
side ﬁnancing policies including health equity funds, vouchers and community health insurance have
been complemented by supply side measures to improve service delivery incentives through contracting.
Multiple rounds of the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey are used to investigate the impact of
ﬁnancing policies on health service utilisation and out of pocket payments both over time using
commune panel data from 1997 to 2011 and across groups using individual data from 2004 and 2009.
Policy combinations including areas with multiple interventions were examined against controls using
difference-in-difference and panel estimation.
Widespread roll-out of ﬁnancing policies combined with user charge formalisation has led to a general
reduction in health spending by the poor. Equity funds are associated with a reduction in out of pocket
payments although the effect of donor schemes is larger than those ﬁnanced by government. Vouchers,
which are aimed only at reproductive health services, has a more modest impact that is enhanced when
combined with other schemes. At the aggregate level changes are less pronounced although there is
evidence that policies take a number of years to have substantial effect.
Health ﬁnancing policies and the supportive systems that they require provide a foundation for more
radical extension of coverage already envisaged by a proposed social insurance system. A policy chal-
lenge is how disparate mechanisms can be integrated to ensure that vulnerable groups remain protected.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Improving ﬁnancial access to services is an essential part of
extending universal health coverage (UHC) in low resource settings.
Strategies typically incorporate a number of elements including
boosting overall funding, increasing the proportion of funding
channelled through pooled funding (particularly publicly funded
insurance mechanisms), diverting spending to services known to
be effective and ensuring equitable ﬁnancial access (Moreno-Serra
and Smith, 2012; Kutzin, 2013).ity of Leeds, Clarendon Way,
Ensor), chhun@cdri.org.kh
bmcpake@unimelb.edu.au
Ltd. This is an open access article uDevelopment of UHC in Cambodia requires action across
each of these elements. Although total spending on health care at
around 6% of GDP (World Development Indicators, data-
bank.worldbank.org/) in Cambodia is about average by South-East
Asian standards, much of this is un-pooled spending on medi-
cines and other private services. Public funding remains at around
20% of total funding on health and penetration of private insurance
is low. Contact with the formal health sector remains low (around
0.5 visits per capita), reﬂected until recently in the limited use of
essential services such as skilled delivery care: until around 2010
only around half women attended a health facility, although the
latest DHS shows an increase to 80% (National Institute of Statistics
DGfH, 2015).
In recent years, health ﬁnancing policy has focused on reducing
the barriers to utilising services particularly amongst the most
vulnerable. Ultimately the intention is to develop a comprehensivender the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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rent policy in Cambodia attempts to ameliorate the effects of
ﬁnancial barriers to service access by targeting resources at “the
poor and groups with special needs” (Government of Cambodia,
2013). Policies implemented include formal user fee exemptions,
health equity funds run by government and development partners,
vouchers and community based health insurance. Impact and
qualitative studies suggest they have a generally positive impact on
access to services particularly by the poor including: equity funds
(Flores et al., 2013; Noirhomme et al., 2007a; Dingle et al., 2013)
and vouchers (Ir et al., 2010; Poel et al., 2014) and performance
funding (Soeters and Grifﬁths, 2003a; Van de Poel et al., 2015).
Using data from the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey, we add to
this evidence by: 1) examining how the initial decision to formalise
user fees affected spending; 2) how the effect of policies have built
up over time; 3) how interactions between policies magnify or
diminish the impact of policies. Following previous studies, we
utilise the gradual roll out of policies across the country to facilitate
a comparison between the policy effect on individuals in inter-
vention areas and similar individuals in control areas. By reviewing
evidence from other studies combined with a consideration of the
impact of all main policies using a regularly collected dataset, we
provide a consolidated overview of the main ﬁnancing changes
over the last 20 years.
The article is arranged as follows. In the next sectionwe describe
the evolution of health ﬁnancing policies in Cambodia. This is fol-
lowed by a description of the methods and data used to assess the
impact of policies and policy combinations on both use of public
health services and health spending per capita. Results are then
described followed by a discussion of these in the context of policy
goals and in comparison to ﬁndings of other studies.
1.1. Health ﬁnancing policies in Cambodia
A series of health ﬁnancing policies designed to improve ﬁnan-
cial access to health services, particularly amongst the poor, have
been rolled out across the country since 1996 (Table 1). Initially
these had the intention of bringing greater transparency and moreTable 1
Health ﬁnancing policy roll out in Cambodia.
Year of
Implementation
Details
1996 User fees: Fees are set by facility committee and approved by Min
99% of revenue is retained in facility; facilities must establish exem
for the poor; some high priority services should be provided with
1998 CBHI: This is a not-for-proﬁt, voluntary insurance scheme selling l
policies to community members. The insured and family are entitl
deﬁned health services at contracted public health facilities. CBHI
the cost of services consumed by its members.
1999 Contracting: This includes contracting-in, contracting-out, and spe
agency arrangements within the health sector aimed at delivering
different clinical and support services, including cleaning, catering
management.
2000 Health Equity Funds (Donor-funded): A social-transfer mechanism
to remove ﬁnancial access barriers to public health facilities receiv
poor through reimbursement of fees from a third-party payer, ma
NGOs. Pre- or post-identiﬁcation are used to identify those who ar
get health free services at the point of use. The third party reimbu
cost of such services to facilities on a monthly basis.
2007 Voucher schemes: Vouchers given to pregnant women to cover 2e
delivery and post-natal care, transportation costs and fees for refe
Some schemes are universal and some target only poor women.
2008 Health Equity Funds (Government-funded): A Government funded
whereby public health facilities provide services free of charge to
ﬁnanced through a transfer from the national budget. The scheme
directly by operational districts (ODs) and Hospitals.stable funding to the public health system. Latterly they have
addressed the low use of services, particularly amongst the poor.
Much of the evidence on the impact of user fees is based on case
studies of districts and individual facilities combined with cross
sectional analysis of the impact of charging on health seeking be-
haviours. There is some evidence that formalisation when imple-
mented with clear rules, strong management and waivers for the
poor can reduce unpredictability over payment and increase uti-
lisation of services (James et al., 2006). User fees bring funding into
a facility that can be used ﬂexibly to improve services including
incentives to staff. A positive impact on utilisation was reported by
early case studies in Takeo district and a maternal care referral fa-
cility (Barber et al., 2004; Akashi et al., 2004). There is also
considerable evidence of the negative impact of user fees. Quali-
tative studies found that exemption rates for health services have
often been low, applied haphazardly and beneﬁted those with
connections to staff rather than the most vulnerable (Khun and
Manderson, 2008). It is suggested that formalisation has contrib-
uted to increased levels of health spending which often lead to
accumulated household debt following episodes of ill health (Van
Damme et al., 2004; Health Economics Task Force, 2000). Fees
may initially have caused patients to seek services in private rather
than public facilities which later encouraged an increase in the
price charged in the private sector (Jacobs and Price, 2004).
To mitigate the rising cost of care use of services particularly
amongst the poor, the government with support and advice from
international agencies has introduced a series of ﬁnancing mech-
anisms. The need for these mechanisms is motivated by the for-
malisation of user fees. Arguably these other mechanisms can only
be made to work once unofﬁcial fees have been eliminated.
The mechanism that has had greatest coverage is the health
equity fund (HEF) mechanismwhich was introduced with ﬁnancial
support from development partners and technical support from
international NGOs from 2000. By 2009, the population of almost
50% of communes was covered by an NGO or Government ﬁnanced
equity fund. HEFs are held by facilities and contribute to the costs of
treatment, transportation and food for patients and carers. Most
early research produced case studies of schemes in particular areas.Communes included
1997 1999 2004 2007 2009 2011 % of total
by 2011
istry of Health;
ption policy
out charge.
38 195 867 1325 1395 1357 84%
ow-cost
ed to use
reimburses
0 1 12 70 140 310 19%
cial operating
a range of
and
0 100 279 256 164 565 35%
designed
ed by the
inly local
e entitled to
rses the
0 1 74 146 586 482 30%
4 ANC visits,
rral to hospital.
0 0 0 54 345 545 34%
subsidy
poor patients
s are managed
0 0 0 0 210 259 16%
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lating use of hospital services by the poor although barriers to ac-
cess remain (Noirhomme et al., 2007a; Hardeman et al., 2004).
Impact evaluations suggest that health equity funds have
improved access to health services of the poor (Hardeman et al.,
2004), reduced out-of-pocket spending and household health
relateddebt (Flores et al., 2013), and increasedpublic health facilities
utilization (Noirhomme et al., 2007b). There remain concerns that
HEFs may not be sustainable in the long-run (Tangcharoensathien
et al., 2011).
While HEFs have largely been viewed as a way of funding care
for the poor, some authors emphasise the role of funds in
improving the type of care provided through more careful pur-
chasing of services on behalf of patients and their role in quality
improvement through selective contracting (Bigdeli and Annear,
2009). Conversely, there is concern that while HEFs are important
in stimulating demand, care is needed to ensure that the supply of
services is adequate (Ir et al., 2010); an issue raised about demand-
side interventions more generally (Murray et al., 2014). Evidence
suggests that inequalities in health status and access to services
have declined in recent years. Several studies suggest that equity
funds and vouchers have contributed to this improvement (Dingle
et al., 2013; Liljestrand and Sambath, 2012). Their effect is, however,
difﬁcult to disentangle from the effects of investment in service
delivery and general improvements in socio-economic status.
Health equity funds are designed to mitigate facility costs once
at a hospital but have less impact on the sometimes substantial
demand-side costs of using services (although some can be used for
transportation costs, the cash is still not available until a patient is
at a facility). Vouchers, introduced from 2007, are complementary
to equity funds since they provide incentives to access lower levels
of the health system and address non-facility ﬁnancial barriers to
care (Ir et al., 2010). Vouchers cover costs of family planning,
antenatal, delivery and postnatal care and also provide reim-
bursement for transport to reach the facility for these services
(Brody et al., 2013). Government and non-government facilities
must be accredited by the programme in order to receive reim-
bursement which may stimulate competition to improve quality
and expand choice to patients. Some voucher schemes are targeted
at the poor while in other cases all are entitled to beneﬁt. Quali-
tative studies suggest that the voucher programme is popular
because it provides a guarantee of reimbursement including
covering transportation costs (Brody et al., 2013). Unsurprisingly in
an environment replete with alternative ﬁnancing mechanisms an
important factor discouraging voucher use was the confusion with
other programmes as well as the precise procedure for qualifying.
Pooling DHS data for 2005 and 2010, Poel at al undertake a
difference-in-difference comparison of the impact of vouchers on
use of antenatal anddelivery care (Poel et al., 2014). After controlling
for household confounding factors, they ﬁnd that use of vouchers is
associated with a 10% increase in delivery care, a 5.3% increase in
post-natal care but no impact on antenatal care. The effect is greater
for the poorest households. Universal schemes appear to have a
larger effect on facility delivery than those that are targeted.
Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI)was introduced in the
mid-1990s to provide low cost insurance for poorer families.
Schemes remain voluntary and cover less than 10% of communes. To
provide universal coverage to wage earners employed in the formal
sector, aMaster Plan for SocialHealth Insurance (SHI)was introduced
in 2005 but was not due to start operation until 2015 (Ly, 2011).
Performance based ﬁnancing initiatives have been a central part
of attempts to improve the delivery of health services. These have
been implemented through the use of contracting models that
permit health facilities to manage resources and receive funding in
a way that is distinct from the government's line budgeting system.Some operational districts were given pilot contracting status from
1999 through a process either of contracting-out, whereby an NGO
was given full autonomy to control staff numbers, or contracting-in,
which limits the autonomy to control over non stafﬁng inputs and
organisation of services within the facility. Since 2009, the Gov-
ernment of Cambodia has incorporated a form of internal con-
tracting into selected health districts known as Special Operating
Agency (SOAs) which deliver services under contract to provincial
health departments. Case studies have focused on the positive
impact of contracting on quality of services and overall service
coverage including the proportion of fully immunised children
(Schwartz and Bhushan, 2004; Soeters and Grifﬁths, 2003b). A
quasi-experimental study, utilising three rounds of the De-
mographic Health Survey to investigate the impact of contacting on
use of reproductive health services, found that households in areas
that have contracted facilities are 25% more likely to have a facility
delivery (Van de Poel et al., 2015).
The large number of different ﬁnancing mechanisms often
coexisting in the same areas makes it difﬁcult to disentangle their
individual effects. Indeed the overlap is often deliberate since as-
pects of one mechanism are meant to enhance or complement
those of another. Vouchers, for example, enhance the effect of eq-
uity funds by covering demand side costs and services below
hospital level. Early contracting pilots developed mechanisms for-
malising user fees (Soeters and Grifﬁths, 2003b). Supply-side in-
centives to practitioners further enhance the effect of demand-side
mechanisms. One study demonstrates the much greater combined
impact of equity funds, vouchers and delivery incentives compared
to incentives alone (Ir et al., 2010). Any assessment of the overall
impact of these schemes needs to take account of the overlapping
and interacting nature of many of them.
2. Methods
The gradual extension of ﬁnancing policies across the country
allows an evaluation of the impact of the policies on household
spending on health care. We make use of data from the Cambodia
Socio Economic Survey (CSES) from 1997 to 2011. Changes in
sampling design, survey method and questions asked mean that
the surveys are not all easily comparable. Surveys in 2007, 2008,
2010 and 2011 were smaller and covered fewer topics than in 2004
and 2009 which limits the range of variables that can be used. This
renders individual level analysis across surveys difﬁcult but still
permits commune level analysis.
The data are used in two ways. Firstly, we pool information on
household behaviour at the commune level to generate an aggre-
gate commune panel data set from 1997 to 2011. This is used to look
at aggregate effects on household health spending across the entire
time period allowing an investigation of the lagged or buildeup
effect of the policy to be captured. Secondly, we focus on the impact
of policies and policy combinations at the individual household
level using the 2004 and 2009 cross-sections of the CSES.
For the panel analysis we look at the impact of the main indi-
vidual policies - user fees, health equity funds (donor and gov-
ernment), vouchers and CBHI e on average household health
spending ðEtcÞ. A mixed effects multilevel model is estimated
allowing commune variables to have ﬁxed and random effects
across areas as follows:
Etc ¼ bþ b1t þ
X
b0pp
p
c þ
X
b
00
pp
p
tc þ
X
b
000
pp
pz
tc þ a4Ztc þ uc
þ ud þ ztc
where for commune c, t is a time trend (1997 ¼ 1), ppc is a dummy
variable where the policy p is implemented sometime during the
T. Ensor et al. / Social Science & Medicine 177 (2017) 118e126 121time period and pptc is a dummy variable for the time period in
which policy p is implemented, Ztc is a vector of characteristics of
households in the commune, ud and uc are district and commune
speciﬁc random-intercepts and ztc is a commune error term. Since
we expect that the impact of policies may build-up over time we
also specify a variable, p
pz
tc , equal to the number of time periods
after the policy is implemented in that area. Data were merged for
all eight CSES between 1997 and 2011 and covariates aggregated at
the commune level and merged with information on the year of
implementation of each policy in each commune.
The cross-sectional household analysis examines the impact of
each policy in more depth taking into account policy combinations
to recognise that these interactions are likely to affect the overall
impact of individual policies. Difference-in-difference is used to
compare the impact on individuals in intervention areas with in-
dividuals in comparison areas (where none of the policies had been
introduced by the end of 2009) adjusting for household, individual
and area covariates. Eight policy combinations are examined be-
tween 2004 and 2009:
1. Control (no policy)
2. User fees only
3. User fees with vouchers
4. User fees within contracting areas
5. User fees with HEFs ﬁnanced by donors
6. User fees with HEFs ﬁnanced by government
7. User fees with vouchers
8. User fees with vouchers and Government HEF
9. User fees with vouchers and Donor HEF
Ofﬁcial user fees are regarded as an essential precursor to all the
policies since they provide a formalised arrangement for under-
standing howmuch facilities charge and so set the size of subsidies
from each source.
The data sets contained an inadequate number of CBHI areas
and sowewere not able to analyse the impact of this policy so these
areas are dropped from our sample. We do not believe that this will
substantially bias the analysis. CBHI communes are in most re-
spects similar to the remaining communes (household structure,
age, sex, urbanisation) although CBHI households appear to be
slightly (7%) wealthier as measured by total consumption. The
policy impact equation is deﬁned as:
Yi ¼ a0 þ a1t þ
X
a0pPp þ
X
a
00
pPp*t þ a3Xi þ a4Zi þ εi
where t is a time dummy (2009 ¼ 1), Pp is a dummy variable for
each of the eight policy (p) combinations, X a vector of household
covariates, Z a vector of community covariates, and ε is an error
term. The coefﬁcient ap3 estimates the difference-in-differenceTable 2
Households included in study by policy type.
2004
Individuals Communes
Control 653 31
User charges 660 30
UC þ vouchers 350 17
UC þ contract 110 4
UC þ vouchers þ contract 200 7
UC þ HEF (donor) 190 9
UC þ HEF (Gov) 270 12
UC þ HEF (Gov) þ vouchers 70 3
UC þ HEF (Donor) þ vouchers 20 1
Total 2523 114
Note: All policies introduced in communes between 2005 and 2009).effect of each individual policy. Standard errors are adjusted for
commune and district level cluster effects.
Two outcomes are examined: the probability of seeking medical
treatment in a public and private facility if sick; and the level of out
of pocket spending per household during the previous month. Out
of pocket spending includes both payment made at the facility,
medications and transport to and from a facility. The ﬁrst outcome
is a bivariate variable and a probit model is used. Public facilities
include public hospitals and health centres. Private facilities are
private hospitals, clinics and pharmacies/drug stores. In the case of
the second outcome, the large number of households reporting
zero spending is likely to render continuous variable estimation,
such as ordinary least squares, biased. Instead we estimate a two
part-model: ﬁrst the discrete decision whether health spending is
non-zero using probit estimation; second, a generalised linear
model (GLM) for households reporting non-zero spending (incor-
porating a log-link function and gamma error distribution). Mar-
ginal effects estimate the overall treatment effect on those exposed
to each policy.
Most of the ﬁnancing policies are designed to focus mainly on
the poor. The Cambodian Ministry of Planning uses a standardised
procedure to identify poor households known as the IDPoor. This is
based on quality of housing condition; the quantity of the house
ﬂoor's size, agricultural land, ﬁshing equipment, livestock, durable
assets, the means of transportation, dependent family members
and other information, as well as the general perception of the
village representative group. Although complete information to
replicate the IDPoor means test is not available we constructed a
wealth index which aggregates the majority of the assets into a
single variable using Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
Data to estimate the impact of policy was drawn from the 2004
and 2009 Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES). Since we wish
to compare the effect of policy implemented at district level on
individuals, we include in the analysis only the clusters that are
common between these two surveys. In addition, we also excluded
households sampled in November and December 2003, as well as
January 2005 from the CSES 2003/04 to ensure that the timing and
duration of sampling in the ﬁeld is equivalent (Table 2).
3. Results
Summary statistics from the CSES suggest that household
spending increased ﬁve-fold in real terms (2005 prices) between
1997 and 2009 and much faster than incomes (Fig. 1) while the
proportion of income devoted to health care increased from 2% to
almost 10%. For the richest, the share of income devoted to health
care was fairly stable over the period but it increased substantially
for the poorest so that by 2009 spending accounted for more than
11% of their total consumption. Since 2009 spending both in2009 Total
Individuals Communes Individuals Communes
528 31 1181 62
1627 93 2287 123
707 37 1057 54
180 9 290 13
99 4 299 11
909 50 1099 59
458 23 728 35
329 17 399 20
30 2 50 3
4867 266 7390 380
Fig. 1. Trends in health spending per household (US dollars) and % of consumption.
Source: Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 1997 to 2011.
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poorest in particular have seen a substantial reduction in the share
of consumption devoted to health care.
The commune panel data from 1997 to 2011 reﬂects the strong
upward time-trend in spending on health care and separately the
positive effect of household economic status (Table 3). An lrtest was
used to compare a model that incorporated random as well as ﬁxed
commune effects with ﬁxed effects only. The mixed effects model
was preferred (Chi2 ¼ 20.1, p < 0.001). Most of the policy dummy
variables for the year in which the policy is implemented in a
commune are positive but not signiﬁcant suggesting that there is
no strong evidence of an immediate impact of any ﬁnancing policyTable 3
Impact of ﬁnancing policy on health spending at commune level (multi-level, mixed
effects).
Coef. SE
Year 0.086 0.007 ***
Commune types
User fee 0.085 0.075
Voucher 0.219 0.070 ***
HEF donor 0.144 0.073 **
HEF government 0.101 0.107
CBHI 0.033 0.089
Implementation dummies
User fee 0.066 0.088
Voucher 0.150 0.152
HEF donor 0.176 0.119
HEF government 0.327 0.255
CBHI 0.150 0.156
Time since implementation
User fee 0.021 0.010 **
Voucher 0.148 0.054 ***
HEF donor 0.056 0.023 **
HEF government 0.097 0.089
CBHI 0.041 0.033
Constant 177.72 14.075 ***
n 3135
Groups 180
Log likelihood 4907
Standard errors (SE) are corrected for clustering at commune and district level.
Additional covariates included: consumption (log), average age, proportion of
households with male heads, household size.
Statistically signiﬁcant at: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level.on household healthcare spending. This is perhaps unsurprising
given that most policies take time to impact on behaviour and
longer still to show up in spending patterns. By contrast, the vari-
able for the number of years since the user fee policy was intro-
duced is positive and statistically signiﬁcant suggesting higher
health care spending in the years following the introduction of user
fees. The coefﬁcients for donor HEF and vouchers are negative and
statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05) and for government HEFs, nega-
tive but not signiﬁcant. Although it is unrealistic to suppose that a
linear trend continues following implementation, estimation sug-
gests that this is an adequate simpliﬁcation over the period of
estimation. Square and logarithmic post implementation trend
terms were also added but did not add signiﬁcantly to the
explanatory power of the model (lrtest produced p ¼ 0.51 and
p ¼ 0.31 respectively).
Marginal effects are obtained for years following implementa-
tion compared to areas where there is no policy (Table 4). These
suggest that after three years, spending is 7% higher in areas
implementing user fees. Conversely in areas with vouchers
spending is 25% lower and 8% lower in areas with donor ﬁnanced
HEF. The results in voucher areas appear large given that voucher
mechanisms focus only on maternal and some other reproductive
health services.
The commune-panel data examines the effect of policy on the
spending of the average household. Most of the policies, however,
are designed to target the poor and other vulnerable groups.
Although we control for commune level living standards and a
general secular trend in spending, we also cannot discount the
possibility that policy-speciﬁc time-trends are confounded by
macro-economic and other secular trends in variables that occur at
the same time as the roll out of speciﬁc ﬁnancing policies.Table 4
Percentage change in average per capita health spending (marginal effects).
Years following
policy change
User fee Voucher Donor HEF
0 0% 11% 12%
1 2% 4% 6%
2 4% 17% 0%
3 7% 25% 8%
T. Ensor et al. / Social Science & Medicine 177 (2017) 118e126 123The second part of the analysis examines policy impact at a
household level between 2004 and 2009. The use of interaction
terms in a difference-in-difference multivariate regression helps to
disentangle the impact of policy from the effect of other covariates
and the general increase in spending over time.
With the exception of areas with vouchers and donor ﬁnanced
equity funds, none of the policies have a signiﬁcant impact on the
utilisation of public facilities by poor households (Table 5). In
contracting areas, there is a signiﬁcant (p ¼ 0.02) negative impact
on utilisation of private facilities and a positive but non-signiﬁcant
(p ¼ 0.17) impact on public facility use. There is a large signiﬁcant
(p < 0.01) impact on the use of public facilities offset by a sub-
stantial reduction in their use of private facilities in areas that have
vouchers and health equity funds. The sample of households in
these areas is, however, extremely small (50 across both years).
For the richest 40%, the impact on utilisation of services is rather
more substantial. A signiﬁcant (p < 0.05) increase in public sector
utilisation is evident in areas with donor equity funds (with and
without vouchers), Government HEF when combined with
vouchers and contracting areas that have vouchers. In most cases
there are increases also in private sector use of facilities in these
areas. This is notable given that most ﬁnancing policies are largely
designed to encourage use of public facilities by the poor.
Formalising user fees in public facilities appears to increase total
per capita health spending across all households, although the ef-
fect is not statistically signiﬁcant (p ¼ 0.2) (Table 6). The effect
averages counteracting effects for poor and non-poor. Spending by
the poor fell by 11,798 riels per capita, per month (p¼ 0.02) while it
increased by 5,215 for the non-poor (p ¼ 0.047). For the poor, both
the number paying a positive amount and the average amount for
payers fell. Conversely the number paying and amount paidTable 5
Total impact on utilisation (marginal effects).
Policy
Publica
Coef. SE
All households
1 User fees (UF) 0.06 0.03 *
2 UF þ vouchers 0.06 0.03 **
3 UF þ contract 0.09 0.04 **
4 UF þ vouchers þ contract 0.06 0.03 *
5 UF þ HEF (donor) 0.11 0.03 ***
6 UF þ HEF (Gov) 0.03 0.08
7 UF þ HEF (Gov) þ vouchers 0.01 0.06
8 UF þ HEF (Donor) þ vouchers 0.12 0.04 ***
Poor (bottom two quintiles)
1 User fees 0.06 0.13
2 UF þ vouchers 0.06 0.15
3 UF þ contract 0.05 0.15
4 UF þ vouchers þ contract 0.37 0.22 *
5 UF þ HEF (donor) 0.13 0.18
6 UF þ HEF (Gov) 0.13 0.15
7 UF þ HEF (Gov) þ vouchers Insufﬁcient utilisation in areas to per
8 UF þ HEF (Donor) þ vouchers 0.95 0.12 ***
Non-poor (Top two quintiles)
1 User fees 0.04 0.02 *
2 UF þ vouchers 0.06 0.03 *
3 UF þ contract 0.02 0.07
4 UF þ vouchers þ contract 0.06 0.03 *
5 UF þ HEF (donor) 0.11 0.04 **
6 UF þ HEF (Gov) 0.04 0.03
7 UF þ HEF (Gov) þ vouchers 0.66 0.08 ***
8 UF þ HEF (Donor) þ vouchers 0.64 0.06 ***
Statistically signiﬁcant at: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level.
Household covariates included: age/sex composition of household, education, occupatio
holding, asset index, year of survey. Community covariates included: presence/absen
gramme for immunisation/HIV/family planning, endemic dengue, regional dummy.
a Public hospital or health centre.
b Non-government hospitals, private clinics and pharmacies/drug-stores.increased for the non-poor.
For the poorest 40% of the sample, most of the policies aimed at
mitigating the effects of charging appear to have an insigniﬁcant,
positive effect onwhether or not a payment is made and a negative
effect on the average positive payment. The overall treatment effect
is negative for all policies. The poor living in areas with health
equity funds ﬁnanced by donors report a larger reduction in
spending, 16,545 riels per capita, per month (p < 0.01). The effect in
government HEF areas is substantially smaller and not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Vouchers implemented on their own appear to have a small, not
signiﬁcant effect on spending; a ﬁnding that is unsurprising since
they are focused only on reproductive health services. However in
areas where vouchers are combined with health equity funds
(government or donor) the negative effect on spending is more
substantial.
Surveys do not separate funding by facility type which hinders
attempts to disaggregate the impact by public and private facility. If
it is assumed that the ﬁrst (2009 survey questionnaire) or main
provider (2004 survey) reﬂects the dominant use of health
spending, the marginal effect on the poor in public facilities for all
policies combined is larger (45,130 riels per month) although sig-
niﬁcant at only the 10% level (p ¼ 0.06).
The application of user fees in contracting areas appears to be
similar to that in non-contracting areas. However the impact on
spending by the poor in contracting areas with vouchers is sub-
stantially larger than in areas that have vouchers but without
contracting.
The impact of the policies on the household health spending of
the relative rich (top two quintiles) is largely positive. In addition to
higher spending for non-poor households in areas that havePrivateb All
Coef. SE Coef. SE
0.02 0.06 0.06 0.07
0.10 0.09 0.16 0.10
0.17 0.07 ** 0.29 0.09 ***
0.33 0.19 * 0.32 0.16 **
0.04 0.07 0.03 0.09
0.24 0.08 *** 0.32 0.10 ***
0.14 0.07 * 0.02 0.08
0.22 0.10 ** 0.36 0.09 ***
0.10 0.20 0.09 0.15
0.28 0.26 0.07 0.18
0.51 0.21 ** 0.11 0.21
0.19 0.27 0.28 0.22
0.12 0.22 0.03 0.17
0.15 0.21 0.20 0.17
mit estimation
3.06 0.35 *** 0.39 0.27
0.14 0.07 * 0.19 0.08 **
0.10 0.09 0.17 0.10 *
0.29 0.14 ** 0.36 0.15 **
0.20 0.18 0.25 0.18
0.08 0.09 0.01 0.10
0.32 0.10 *** 0.36 0.10 ***
0.25 0.06 *** 0.26 0.06 ***
0.38 0.13 *** 0.56 0.13 ***
n, ethnic group, age, sex and marital status of head of household,, household land-
ce drug-store, distance to health centre/district hospital, presence of public pro-
Table 6
Total per capita spending on health by household (per day in riels) two part regressions and total impact (marginal effect).
Policy
Probit GLM Combined
Coef. SE Coef. SE Change in spending SE Relative effect
All households
1 User charges 0.12 0.21 0.33 0.29 5215 134 43%
2 UC þ vouchers 0.43 0.25 0.16 0.35 2675 161 20%
3 UC þ contract 0.83 0.22 0.09 0.33 9779 152 73%
4 UC þ vouchers þ contract 0.83 0.52 0.81 0.36 943 227 7%
5 UC þ HEF (donor) 0.33 0.27 0.62 0.39 3911 181 28%
6 UC þ HEF (Gov) 0.57 0.26 0.09 0.38 6982 175 53%
7 UC þ HEF (Gov) þ vouchers 0.33 0.31 1.22 0.39 11,085 188 82%
8 UC þ HEF (Donor) þ vouchers 0.87 0.42 0.55 0.33 15,640 197 119%
Poor (bottom two quintiles)
1 User charges 0.33 0.43 0.98 0.40 11,798 167 70%
2 UC þ vouchers 0.38 0.47 0.80 0.52 4549 200 41%
3 UC þ contract 0.27 0.46 1.27 0.43 9833 178 66%
4 UC þ vouchers þ contract 0.79 0.66 2.27 0.51 14,989 234 84%
5 UC þ HEF (donor) 0.10 0.51 1.68 0.44 16,545 190 83%
6 UC þ HEF (Gov) 0.11 0.48 0.96 0.46 8126 186 58%
7 UC þ HEF (Gov) þ vouchers 1.67 0.52 1.07 0.47 23,194 201 96%
8 UC þ HEF (Donor) þ vouchers 0.24 0.66 1.94 0.61 16,271 256 83%
Non-poor (Top two quintiles)
1 User charges 0.40 0.23 0.44 0.36 10,617 176 112%
2 UC þ vouchers 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.48 854 235 9%
3 UC þ contract 1.15 0.44 0.08 0.83 12,325 413 78%
4 UC þ vouchers þ contract 0.38 0.55 0.87 0.64 7721 311 44%
5 UC þ HEF (donor) 0.33 0.27 0.93 0.62 8148 291 48%
6 UC þ HEF (Gov) 0.95 0.26 0.25 0.47 8316 223 42%
7 UC þ HEF (Gov) þ vouchers 0.02 0.17 1.42 0.53 19,028 236 320%
8 UC þ HEF (Donor) þ vouchers 1.15 0.52 0.88 0.48 24,978 300 371%
Statistically signiﬁcant at: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level.
Covariates included: as for Table 5.
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that have in addition health equity funds (government), contracting
and health equity funds combined with voucher schemes. A
reduction in spending is reported in areas that have donor health
equity funds and vouchers with contracting but these are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant (p > 0.35).
4. Discussion
4.1. Limitations
The introduction of a variety of policies with similar objectives
often in the same areas means that it is challenging to disentangle
their effects. Although the study allows interactions between pol-
icies this cannot account for all local variations where imple-
mentation is left to health facilities and implementing non-
government organisations. Any assessment of general policies us-
ing national data inevitably averages and simpliﬁes the speciﬁc
impacts of local policy. Furthermore, the intervention landscape in
Cambodia is crowded and it is difﬁcult to describe and account for
the effect of all policies on spending and utilisation. We cannot rule
out that other policies not included in the analysis are inﬂuencing
the results reported here. The data analysed here is historic,
spanning the introduction of user fees and gradual development of
ﬁnancing schemes. It does not cover the most recent period when
equity funds have expanded substantially to cover much of the
country.
The analysis is limited by the relatively crude nature of the
health service utilisation data which indicate whether or not ser-
vices were provided but not what was received during a visit and
whether the services were necessary. The impact evaluation does
not, therefore, provide an understanding of whether policies
encouraged more effective use of services. The way households
were asked to report providers used also varied across surveys
making it difﬁcult to separate out accurately the spending that isattributable to public and private facilities. Furthermore, it was not
possible to separate unofﬁcial from ofﬁcial payments. We observe
that formalisation appears to have little effect on total payments
and assume that this was because unofﬁcial payments arrange-
ments were formalised. We cannot, however, be certain that sub-
stantive unofﬁcial payments did not continue to displace ofﬁcial
fees. Evidence from elsewhere, however, suggests that formal-
isation was successful in that income from this source rose sub-
stantially over the period. By 2012, user fee income in public
facilities amounted to $27 million across the country (Government
of Cambodia, 2013).
The difference-in-difference method assumes parallel trends
implying that without policy the change in health spending and
utilisation would have been at similar levels in intervention and
control areas. We apply a parallel trends (Pischke, 2016) test by
regressing average health spending interactions between the policy
variable and time-dummy variables, a time variable and policy
dummy; signiﬁcance of the interaction term after policy introduc-
tion but not before is taken as evidence supporting the parallel
trends assumption. Between 1999 and 2004, the proportion of
communes with any policy increased from 12 to 55%. We take 2004
as the breakpoint year of particular signiﬁcance. We ﬁnd that co-
efﬁcients on the interaction term prior to 2004 were not signiﬁcant
(1997 p¼ 0.35, 2000 p¼ 0.13) while after 2004 coefﬁcients they are
all signiﬁcant (p < 0.02 for all years). We also looked at the char-
acteristics of the areas with and without ﬁnancing policies (based
on a Mann-Whitney non-parametric test for survey mid-year,
2004) and found no statistically signiﬁcant differences in charac-
teristics including household consumptions (p ¼ 0.18), proportion
living in urban areas (p ¼ 0.15) or reported illness episodes (0.79).
4.2. Formalising user fees
User fees were designed to formalise payment arrangements
and provide facilities with additional income. Fixing fees with clear
T. Ensor et al. / Social Science & Medicine 177 (2017) 118e126 125exemptions was designed to make fees more transparent and
predictable. Retention of a large proportion of the revenue by fa-
cilities should help to improve services but may also encourage
facilities to collect from those that are unable to pay. It has been
observed that these features introduced a dimension of output-
based funding that have allowed services to develop (Bigdeli and
Ir, 2010).
The policy of formalising user fees had no signiﬁcant detectable
impact on the utilisation of public (or private) facilities in the full
sample. This ﬁnding differs from previous studies (Barber et al.,
2004; Akashi et al., 2004) which report an increase in the uti-
lisation of inpatient and outpatient health services following the
formalisation of user fees. This may be due to methodological dif-
ferences such as estimation strategies and sample-types. Previous
studies have used samples drawn from a smaller population and a
simple before-after estimation strategy while we use a nationally
representative sample and estimation strategies that control for
confounding factors.
Utilisation and the proportion of the poor paying some charge
showed no signiﬁcant change but those utilising services paid
substantially less than before. The poor are thus no more dissuaded
to access services under formal compared to informal fees. Once at
a facility, the negative impact on payments for the poor suggests
that they paid less in areas where fees are formalised as informal
fees were replaced with formal tariffs that often offer local waivers
for those on low incomes. The non-poor paid more than before the
change and were slightly more likely to utilise public and private
services. A lagged effect of user fees over a longer time period is
suggested by the panel data. Fees paid by the non-poor appear to
more than substitute for any reduction in unofﬁcial fees so that on
average they pay more than before but their utilisation is unaf-
fected. Previous studies have suggested that revenues generated
through the formalisation of user fees have been used within fa-
cilities to provide exemptions to poorer users (Akashi et al., 2004).
This may explain the differential impact of the policy on OOP
payments incurred by the poor and non-poor.
4.3. Reducing ﬁnancial barriers
Efforts to reduce the burden of health care costs on the popu-
lation show mixed effects. Most of the policies reduced payments
by poor households. The reductions are particularly large for areas
that combine policies with the largest effects in areas that com-
bined health equity funds and voucher mechanisms. The panel
analysis further suggest the effects appear to build up over time
possibly as mechanisms are strengthened and entitlement is more
widely known to the population.
It is interesting to compare the effects of mitigation policies with
areas that introduced only user fees. Some of the policies appear to
have a weaker effect on per capita payments than do the effect of
user fees alone. Heterogeneity in the application of user fees may
partly explain this effect if areas that have user fee policies that
have had a particularly negative impact on service uptake are the
areas that are more likely to implement mitigation policies.
There are no previous studies looking at the quantitative impact
of user fee formalisation.Where comparisons of policy can bemade
with previous studies, changes recorded are comparable. Flores et
found that the reduction for households in donor funded HEF areas
was 9,000 (per day) compared to the 16,000 we ﬁnd here but
conﬁdence intervals overlap (Flores et al., 2013). The same study
found a (not signiﬁcant) reduction of 8,700 for government HEFs
compared to 8,100 found here. Similarly, the ﬁnding on the impact
of HEFs on health service utilisation by the poor resonates with
previous studies. The only signiﬁcant impact on utilisation was
found for areas that have both vouchers and health equity fundswhich demonstrated a signiﬁcant reduction in private sector use,
increase in use of the public sector and substantial reduction in
health care spending (albeit a ﬁnding derived from a relatively
small sample). The strong impact of vouchers in the panel analysis
is somewhat puzzling given that vouchers only apply to a small
number of reproductive health services. A previous study suggested
a strong positive effect on maternal care utilisation (antenatal and
delivery care) that is larger for the poor (Poel et al., 2014) but this
utilised reproductive health survey data whereas our results are
based on a more general survey. Our household analysis makes
clear, however, that the impact is only large and signiﬁcant where
they are introduced together with health equity funds or con-
tracting. This suggests that the recorded effects of vouchers in the
panel analysis may be picking up the effects of other policies as a
result of their correlation in roll-out. This is corrected in the more
detailed consideration of interactions undertaken in the household
analysis which isolates the individual and joint effect of policies.
Several policy combinations appear to encourage use of public
services by the non-poor which is possibly partly due to the uni-
versality of some policies in some areas, notablymaternal vouchers.
It may also be that the additional funding provided through these
mechanisms allows a general improvement in services that beneﬁt
those most able to access them. There are also likely to be differ-
ences in theway households are deﬁned as poor between collecting
survey data on the poor and time of service use.
With a few exceptions the impact of different policy combina-
tions on household payments are not substantially different. Some
effects spill-over to the non-poor and even to the use of facilities
outside the public sector. One interpretation of this is that although
individual policies have different objectives most require general
health system strengthening - improving human resources,
enhanced ﬁnancial management, quality of care improvements,
better information systems e that have an impact well beyond the
individual scheme. It suggests the need to consolidate existing
schemes, focusing on the aspects of mechanisms such as equity
funds that are most cost-effective. This would provide a foundation
for more radical extension of coverage for health care costs that
could lead to the development of universal health coverage. It also
begs the question of whether the mitigation of costs could be
achieved more cost-effectively and without the huge investment in
often overlapping, parallel systems. Further work is recommended
to look at the relative cost-effectiveness of these often overlapping
mechanisms in the context of the development of a coordinated
approach to policy.
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